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Making Up for Lost Educational 
Opportunities 
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN COMPENSATORY 
EDUCATION AND ADDITIONAL SERVICES AS 
REMEDIES UNDER THE IDEA  
INTRODUCTION 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)1 
provides that students with disabilities are entitled to a free 
appropriate public education (FAPE).2 One of the original 
purposes of the IDEA was to reduce parents’ reliance on the 
judicial system to obtain relief for children with disabilities 
who have been denied a FAPE.3 Despite the intentions of 
  
 1 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006). The IDEA was originally named the 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act. See Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773. In 1990, Congress revised and 
amended the Act, renaming it the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 
See Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-476, 
§ 901(a)(1), 104 Stat. 1103, 1141-42. In 2004, the Act was amended and reauthorized as 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act. See Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-446, § 1, 118 Stat. 2647, 
2647. Given the various amendments and name changes over the years, the IDEA is 
often referred to as the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA); the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA); Public Law 94-142; the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA); and the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act (IDEIA). See THOMAS F. GUERNSEY & KATHE KLARE, SPECIAL 
EDUCATION LAW 3 (3d ed. 2008) (tracing the name changes of the Act). For the sake of 
clarity, this note will use either “IDEA” or “the Act” when referring to the Act, except 
when discussing the history of the Act.  
 2 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). 
 3 S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1433. 
In 1975, the Senate Committee expressed its intention of providing a guarantee of 
equal educational opportunity, reducing parents’ reliance on the judicial system: 
[P]arents of handicapped children have begun to recognize that their children 
are being denied services which are guaranteed under the Constitution. It 
should not, however, be necessary for parents throughout the country to 
continue utilizing the courts to assure themselves a remedy. It is this 
Committee’s belief that the Congress must take a more active role under its 
responsibility for equal protection of the laws to guarantee that handicapped 
children are provided equal educational opportunity. It can no longer be the 
policy of the Government to merely establish an unenforceable goal requiring 
all children to be in school.  
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Congress, tensions between parents and school districts have 
grown over the last thirty-five years, with both parties resorting 
to the courts for clarification of the IDEA’s mandates.4  
A primary source of IDEA litigation has been the 
continuing confusion over what constitutes an “appropriate” 
remedy for the denial of a FAPE.5 The IDEA did not originally 
clarify what relief is available to remedy a denial of a FAPE, 
stating simply that courts can grant “such relief as the court 
determines is appropriate.”6 While courts initially interpreted 
the word appropriate narrowly, the range of available remedies 
expanded in recent years.7 In its amendments to the IDEA, 
Congress codified and clarified some of the judicially created 
remedies, such as tuition reimbursement.8 However, Congress 
has not clarified whether compensatory educational services 
are appropriate remedies under the IDEA, leaving the issue for 
the courts to decide.9 
The lower courts, lacking clarification from Congress 
and the Supreme Court, have struggled to outline the contours 
of compensatory educational services as remedies for denials of 
FAPE, resulting in a confusing body of jurisprudence.10 Courts 
do not agree on the availability of the remedy,11 and the circuits 
  
Id. The amount of litigation surrounding the IDEA has been a continuing concern of 
Congress and later amendments have attempted to address the problem. See Tara L. 
Eyer, Comment, Greater Expectations: How the 1997 IDEA Amendments Raise the 
Basic Floor of Opportunity for Children with Disabilities, 103 DICK. L. REV. 613, 626-27 
(1999). 
 4 Alison Leigh Cowan, Amid Affluence, a Struggle over Special Education, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2005, § 1, at 37, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/24/ 
education/24westport.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1%22%20costs&sq&st=cse%22special%
20education&scp=3. 
 5 See CHARLES J. RUSSO & ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR., ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS & 
SCHOOL-BASED CASES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 233 (2008). 
 6 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). 
 7 See MITCHELL L. YELL, THE LAW AND SPECIAL EDUCATION 294 (1998) 
(explaining that the definition of “appropriate relief” has expanded to include not only 
injunctive remedies, but also other remedies such as tuition reimbursement and 
compensatory education). 
 8 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) (outlining the tuition reimbursement 
remedy); RUSSO & OSBORNE, JR., supra note 5, at 233; see also infra Part III.A. 
 9 See generally GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 235-37 (tracing the 
history of compensatory education). 
 10 See James Schwellenbach, Comment, Mixed Messages: An Analysis of the 
Conflicting Standards Used by the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals When 
Awarding Compensatory Education for a Violation of the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, 53 ME. L. REV. 245, 266-79 (2001) (examining the different standards 
used by the circuit courts in compensatory education cases). 
 11 Compare Manchester Sch. Dist. v. Christopher B., 807 F. Supp. 860, 868-69 
(D.N.H. 1992) (finding that compensatory education can only be awarded to students 
who are over twenty-one or otherwise ineligible for services under the IDEA), with 
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have developed different standards for addressing compensatory 
education awards.12 Further complicating the issue is the 
ongoing uncertainty surrounding what standard the courts 
should apply to determine whether a student has been denied a 
FAPE and is therefore entitled to compensatory educational 
services.13 Central to this confusion is the issue of whether 
compensatory education should be available to students who 
are no longer protected by the IDEA because they have 
graduated or turned twenty-one years of age.14 
In theory, compensatory educational services remedies 
can be divided into two distinct categories: (1) “compensatory 
education” and (2) “additional services.”15 While the two 
remedies are similar, there are significant differences between 
them, especially regarding the legal standards that should be 
applied to each. On the one hand, “compensatory education” is 
an exceptional remedy that requires a school district to fund a 
child’s education even after the child is no longer protected by 
the IDEA because she has either graduated or reached the age 
of twenty-one.16 “Additional services,” on the other hand, can 
only be awarded as a remedy to students who are still eligible for 
instruction under the IDEA, but have been improperly denied 
services.17 Courts tend to lump both remedies together under the 
“compensatory education” title.18 However, this note argues that 
the two remedies should be treated differently, and different 
  
Student X v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-CV-2316, 2008 WL 4890440, at *24 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008) (finding that compensatory education can be awarded to 
students both under and over twenty-one years old). 
 12 See Schwellenbach, supra note 10, at 266-79. 
 13 See generally David Ferster, Broken Promises: When Does a School’s 
Failure to Implement an Individualized Education Program Deny a Disabled Student a 
Free and Appropriate Public Education, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 71, 87-96 (2010) 
(comparing the “materiality” standard with the per se approach); Dixie Snow Huefner, 
Updating the FAPE Standard Under IDEA, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 367, 373-77 (2008) 
(advocating for an updated FAPE standard). 
 14 See GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 237. 
 15 Impartial Hearing Officers (IHO) in New York treat the two compensatory 
remedies distinctly, following the reasoning of the New York Office of State Review. 
See, e.g., Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 08-072, 11 (N.Y. State 
Educ. Dep’t Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2008/08-072.pdf 
(distinguishing compensatory education from additional services). 
 16 Somoza v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 538 F.3d 106, 109 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 17 Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 08-072, 11 (N.Y. State 
Educ. Dep’t Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2008/08-072.pdf. 
 18 See, e.g., Student X v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-CV-2316, 2008 WL 
4890440, at *28 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008) (referring to the remedy as “compensatory 
education” when in reality the court was awarding “additional services”). 
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standards should be used to evaluate cases contemplating each 
type of relief.  
The difference between the two remedies is especially 
important in the Second Circuit, where the court has traditionally 
applied a strict “gross violation” standard to compensatory 
education cases.19 In Student X v. New York City Department of 
Education, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York awarded a compensatory remedy to a 
student who was still qualified for protection under the IDEA 
without deciding whether the “gross violation” standard applied 
outside the context of compensatory education awards.20 Whether 
the “gross violation” standard applies to additional services cases 
is still an open question in the Second Circuit.21 
Part I of this note explores the background and history 
of the IDEA, as well as the IDEA’s requirements for school 
districts. Part II examines the standards courts employ to 
determine whether a student has been denied a FAPE, arguing 
that courts should apply different standards depending on 
whether they are awarding compensatory education or 
additional services. In the context of additional services awards, 
part II advocates for the adoption of a standard that better 
reflects recent amendments to the IDEA. Part III considers the 
development of both types of compensatory remedies—
“compensatory education” and “additional services”—in detail. 
Finally, part IV uses the Second Circuit’s “gross violation” 
standard to illustrate the confusion that stems from the current 
application of the IDEA and proposes solutions to help courts 
craft better compensatory remedies. 
I. BACKGROUND AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE IDEA 
Much of the confusion surrounding the applicable legal 
standards for compensatory educational services awards 
originates from the maturation of the IDEA’s goals and 
  
 19 See, e.g., Mrs. C v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 20 Student X, 2008 WL 4890440, at *23-24 (finding that the student was 
entitled to a compensatory remedy and that regardless of whether the gross violation 
standard applied, it had been satisfied). 
 21 See id. at *24-25. The “gross violation” standard has not been adopted by 
any of the other federal circuit courts. See Schwellenbach, supra note 10, at 266-79 
(examining the different standards used by each circuit court in compensatory 
education cases). 
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purposes,22 as well as the evolving nature of the remedies 
available under the IDEA.23 The history of the IDEA provides 
the necessary context for understanding the source of judicial 
confusion regarding these remedies, while the IDEA’s 
requirements supply the essential framework for addressing 
why these two forms of relief should be treated distinctly. 
A. History and Overview of the IDEA 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, most states 
had compulsory school attendance laws, yet many states—
either by court decree or statute—allowed for the exclusion of 
students with disabilities.24 Special education students, viewed 
as a disruptive influence in the classroom, were often 
segregated from the general education population.25 The 
prevailing view at the time was that students with disabilities 
“were unable to reap the benefits of a good education.”26 
The educational prospects for children with disabilities 
improved significantly with the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.27 In Brown, the Supreme 
Court stressed the importance of providing a public education: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and 
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in 
the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even 
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good 
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the 
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional 
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. 
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to 
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal 
terms.28 
  
 22 See, e.g., Huefner, supra note 13, at 369-77 (tracing some of the important 
amendments to the IDEA). 
 23 See GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 235-37; see also infra Part III. 
 24 See generally YELL, supra note 7, at 54-55 (discussing compulsory 
attendance and the exclusion of students with disabilities). 
 25 LAURA ROTHSTEIN & SCOTT F. JOHNSON, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 9 (4th 
ed. 2010). 
 26 YELL, supra note 7, at 54-55. 
 27 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 28 Id. at 493. 
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This reasoning from Brown formed an important basis for later 
cases that were brought on behalf of students with 
disabilities.29 In both Pennsylvania Association for Retarded 
Citizens (PARC) v. Pennsylvania30 and Mills v. Board of 
Education,31 the federal courts relied partially on Brown to 
establish that students with disabilities are entitled to a free 
public education and that this right should be protected by 
procedural safeguards.32 In turn, the principles established in 
PARC and Mills were largely incorporated by Congress in the 
passing of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
(EAHCA) in 1975.33 
Prior to the enactment of the EAHCA, the precursor to 
the IDEA, Congress determined that the needs of students 
with disabilities were not being met.34 Specifically, Congress 
realized that many special education students were not being 
properly identified and diagnosed by schools, were not 
receiving appropriate educational interventions, and were often 
unnecessarily alienated from their peers.35 To address these 
problems, Congress enacted the Act to guarantee that special 
  
 29 See YELL, supra note 7, at 59. 
 30 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). In PARC, the state of Pennsylvania 
entered into a consent agreement to provide all students with intellectual disabilities 
between the ages of six and twenty-one a “free public program of education and 
training appropriate to [the students’] learning capabilities.” Id. at 302. The consent 
agreement also provided parents of students with intellectual disabilities procedural 
protections, such as notice and the right to a hearing. Id. at 303. 
 31 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). In Mills, the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia ordered the school district to provide students with 
disabilities “a free and suitable publicly-supported education.” Id. at 878. The Mills 
court set forth detailed due process hearing procedures the school district was required 
to implement and follow. Id. at 879-83. 
 32 See YELL, supra note 7, at 59-60 (discussing the importance of Brown to 
later cases brought on behalf of students with disabilities); see also H. RUTHERFORD 
TURNBULL III, FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE LAW AND CHILDREN WITH 
DISABILITIES 30 (3d ed. 1990) (“Although Brown established the right to an equal 
educational opportunity based upon Fourteenth Amendment grounds, it was not until 
[PARC] v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Mills v. D.C. Board of Education that 
Brown became meaningful for handicapped children.”). 
 33 See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-
142, 89 Stat. 773; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 193-94 (1982) 
(examining the legislative history of the Act). The purpose of the EAHCA was to 
provide students with disabilities access to a FAPE. See Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(c), 89 
Stat. 773, 775 (1975). The Supreme Court initially interpreted the original version of 
the Act as providing a “basic floor of opportunity.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201. 
 34 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2006). 
 35 See id.; see also Terry Jean Seligmann, A Diller, a Dollar: Section 1983 
Damage Claims in Special Education Lawsuits, 36 GA. L. REV. 465, 472-73 (2002) 
(examining Congress’s findings that students with disabilities were being excluded 
from school or otherwise not being provided with an appropriate education). 
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education students would receive an appropriate education to 
meet their unique needs.36 
The IDEA’s primary purpose was to address the needs 
of millions of students with disabilities by ensuring their access 
to a “free appropriate public education.”37 The underlying policy 
of the Act is expressly stated in the statute: 
Disability is a natural part of the human experience and in no way 
diminishes the right of individuals to participate in or contribute to 
society. Improving educational results for children with disabilities 
is an essential element of our national policy of ensuring equality of 
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic 
self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.38 
The purpose of the IDEA is not only to protect the 
educational rights of students with disabilities, but also to 
assist state and local agencies in providing appropriate 
education for this population of students.39 Thus, the IDEA is 
intended to ensure that states provide early intervention 
programs to identify students with disabilities so that their 
individual needs can be properly addressed at an early age.40  
Unlike other legislation to protect persons with 
disabilities, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
the IDEA, largely a funding statute, is unique in its application 
to the states.41 While the ADA applies to schools regardless of 
whether they accept federal funding, the IDEA provides 
additional federal funds to states that conform to the rules and 
policies of the Act.42 Unlike the ADA, the IDEA “is couched in 
the language of specific positive education rights, rather than 
that of nondiscrimination.”43 The substantive right conferred by 
the IDEA is access to a FAPE, in the least restrictive 
  
 36 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). 
 37 Id. § 1400(c)(2). 
 38 Id. § 1400(c)(1). 
 39 Id. § 1400(d). 
 40 Id. 
 41 See GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 9. 
 42 20 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (“Each State that receives funds under this chapter 
shall—(1) ensure that any State rules, regulations, and policies relating to this chapter 
conform to the purposes of this chapter; (2) identify in writing to local educational 
agencies located in the State and the Secretary any such rule, regulation, or policy as a 
State-imposed requirement that is not required by this chapter and Federal regulations; 
and (3) minimize the number of rules, regulations, and policies to which the local 
educational agencies and schools located in the State are subject under this chapter.”). 
 43 Lynn M. Daggett, Perry A. Zirkel & LeeAnn L. Gurysh, For Whom the 
School Bell Tolls but Not the Statute of Limitations: Minors and the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 717, 727 (2005). 
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environment (LRE), that is specially tailored to meet the 
individual needs of a student.44 While states have the option to 
accept funding under the IDEA, and thereby agree to be bound 
by its requirements, every state has opted to do so.45 
B. Requirements of the IDEA 
The IDEA requires schools to provide a FAPE to each 
student with a disability. A FAPE has two components: (1) a 
“special education” program and (2) “related services.”46 
“Special education” is defined in the regulations as “specially 
designed instruction . . . conducted in the classroom, in the 
home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings” and 
also includes physical education.47 “Related services” include 
“supportive services” such as counseling and speech therapy.48 
School districts must provide these two components of a FAPE 
at public expense, without any charge to the parents, from 
preschool through secondary school.49  
School districts must follow specific regulations under 
the IDEA that require school districts to (1) evaluate students 
with disabilities before providing special education services,50 
(2) tailor each special education student’s program according to 
his or her “Individualized Education Program,”51 (IEP) and (3) 
  
 44 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(1)(A), 1412(a)(5). 
 45 See YELL, supra note 7, at 72. New Mexico was the last state to accept 
IDEA funding, upon realizing that in order to meet the mandates of Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act it essentially had to comply with much of the IDEA. Id. 
 46 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). 
 47 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(a)(1) (2010). 
 48 Id. § 300.34(a). The regulation reads in part: 
Related services means transportation and such developmental, corrective, 
and other supportive services as are required to assist a child with a 
disability to benefit from special education, and includes speech-language 
pathology and audiology services, interpreting services, psychological 
services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic 
recreation, early identification and assessment of disabilities in children, 
counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, orientation and 
mobility services, and medical services for diagnostic or evaluation purposes. 
Related services also include school health services and school nurse services, 
social work services in schools, and parent counseling and training. 
Id. 
 49 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). Generally, states must provide students between ages 
three and twenty-one with a FAPE, see id. § 1412(a)(1)(A), but in all cases for students 
between the ages of five and seventeen. See id. § 1412(a)(1)(B); see also TURNBULL III, 
supra note 32, at 37 (discussing age requirements). 
 50 34 C.F.R. § 300.301. 
 51 Id. § 300.323. 
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provide procedural safeguards to protect the rights of parents 
and students.52  
1. Evaluations 
A student cannot receive special education services until 
she has been properly evaluated to determine whether she has 
a disability and, if so, whether she requires special education 
services.53 The IDEA and U.S. Department of Education 
regulations specify the procedures school districts must follow 
in identifying and evaluating students who might have a 
disability.54 Either a parent or the school may request an initial 
evaluation to determine if a child has a disability.55 Once a 
request has been made, a public agency56 must conduct an 
evaluation, which must consist of a variety of assessment tools 
and methods to compile relevant data on the student, including 
his or her academic, functional, and developmental levels.57 
This information must then be used to determine whether the 
student has a disability and to identify the child’s educational 
needs.58 Schools are then required to reevaluate identified 
students at least every three years unless the school and 
parents agree otherwise.59 
2. The Individualized Education Program (IEP) 
Schools are required to provide each identified special 
education student with an IEP, which is a written document 
that is developed and reviewed according to specified 
  
 52 Id. § 300.500. 
 53 See YELL, supra note 7, at 223. 
 54 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.301. 
 55 34 C.F.R. § 300.301. The school district must obtain parental consent 
before commencing the initial evaluation of a child. Id. § 300.300(a)(1). If the parent 
fails to consent to the initial evaluation, school districts may, but are not required, to 
utilize the procedural safeguards outlined in 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 to seek an initial 
evaluation of a student with a suspected disability. Id. § 300.300(a)(3)(i). 
 56 “Public agency” includes the state educational agency, local educational 
agency, educational service agency, nonprofit public charter schools, or “any other 
political subdivisions of the State that are responsible for providing education to 
children with disabilities.” Id. § 300.33. 
 57 See id. § 300.304(b); see also GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 57-74 
(summarizing the identification and evaluation requirements of the IDEA). 
 58 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.301(a). 
 59 34 C.F.R. § 300.303(b). While the reevaluation process is only required 
every three years, the IEP Team is required to meet at least annually to review each 
special education student’s IEP. See id. § 300.324(b). 
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procedures.60 The Supreme Court has described the IEP as the 
“centerpiece” of the Act—the “primary vehicle” for carrying out 
Congress’s goals.61 Each IEP must include (1) a statement of the 
student’s current level of functioning;62 (2) a statement of 
“measurable annual goals” designed to meet the student’s 
individual needs;63 (3) a description of how and when progress 
towards these goals will be measured;64 (4) a statement of the 
related services to be provided to the student;65 (5) a statement 
explaining to what extent, if any, a child will be excluded from 
the regular classroom;66 and (6) a statement outlining any 
testing accommodations to be provided to the student.67 The 
IDEA regulations also require the IEP to be developed and 
reviewed annually by an “IEP Team,” which must include the 
parents and specified teaching professionals.68  
3. Procedural Safeguards 
In addition to the evaluation and IEP requirements, 
school districts must also provide procedural safeguards to 
protect the due process rights of parents and students.69 One of 
the primary protections provided by the IDEA is the parental 
right to notice.70 School districts are required to provide parents 
with notice, written in plain English, explaining all of the 
procedural safeguards under the IDEA.71 Each school district is 
  
 60 Id. § 300.320(a). 
 61 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988). 
 62 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a)(1). The statement of a student’s present level of 
functioning must also state how the child’s disability affects his or her participation in 
the general education curriculum. Id. 
 63 Id. § 300.320(a)(2). The annual goals are required to be designed to meet a 
student’s individual needs and to allow the student to make progress in the general 
education curriculum. Id. 
 64 Id. § 300.320(a)(3). Schools are required to periodically issue reports on 
whether the student is meeting his or her IEP goals. Id. These reports should be issued 
when report cards are provided. Id. 
 65 Id. § 300.320(a)(4). The IEP must also include a statement of what 
“program modifications or supports” will be provided to allow the student to reach his 
or her annual goals. Id. 
 66 Id. § 300.320(a)(5). 
 67 Id. § 300.320(a). 
 68 Id. §§ 300.321, 300.324(b). The “IEP Team” must include the parents of the 
child, at least one regular education teacher, at least one special education teacher, a 
representative of the school district, and, whenever appropriate, the child. Id. § 300.321. 
 69 Id. § 300.500. 
 70 See GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 147 (“The significance of notice as 
a procedural right cannot be underestimated.”). 
 71 34 C.F.R. § 300.504. 
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also required to have procedures in place that allow parents to 
challenge school district action (or inaction) under the IDEA and 
to resolve disputes.72 The IDEA requires school districts to 
develop a voluntary mediation process where the parents and 
school districts can attempt to reach a legally binding 
resolution.73 If the mediation process is unsuccessful, parents can 
proceed with a due process complaint through the school 
district’s impartial hearing process.74 Once a parent or school 
district has exhausted this administrative process, the aggrieved 
party may bring a civil action in either state or federal court.75  
The evaluations, IEP processes, and procedural 
safeguards required by the IDEA were designed by Congress to 
achieve the dual goals of guaranteeing special education students 
access to a FAPE and ensuring parental participation in the 
process.76 Given the IDEA’s procedurally centered framework, 
perhaps it is no surprise that courts developed a FAPE standard 
that scrutinizes a school’s compliance with the Act’s procedural 
mandates as well as a school’s fulfillment of the IDEA’s 
substantive requirements.77 Despite Congress’s continued 
emphasis on the IDEA’s procedural requirements, courts have 
failed to recalibrate the standards for awarding compensatory 
educational services to account for the increasingly complex 
requirements enumerated in recent IDEA amendments, 
especially for the IEP creation and implementation process.78 
  
 72 Id. § 300.506(a). 
 73 Id. § 300.506. 
 74 See id. § 300.511; see generally Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of 
Hearing and Review Officers Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 58 
ADMIN. L. REV. 401 (2006) (examining the remedial authority of impartial hearing and 
review officers under the IDEA). The IDEA allows states to have either a one- or two-
tiered administrative review process. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2006). If the initial 
impartial hearing is conducted by any agency besides the state’s educational agency, 
then the party must be allowed to appeal to the state’s educational agency. See 34 
C.F.R. § 300.514 (setting forth the requirements of an administrative appeal at the 
state administrative level). 
 75 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). 
 76 See Thomas F. Guernsey, When the Teachers and Parents Can’t Agree, Who 
Really Decides? Burdens of Proof and Standards of Review Under the Education for all 
Handicapped Children Act, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 67, 70 (1988). 
 77 See infra Part II. 
 78 See Dixie Snow Huefner, The Risks and Opportunities of the IEP 
Requirements Under IDEA ‘97, 33 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 195, 196-97 (2000) (comparing the 
1990 and 1997 versions of the IDEA and finding the latter to have expanded the IEP 
requirements). 
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II. DEFINING “FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION” 
The IDEA requires school districts to provide students 
with disabilities a “free appropriate public education,” but the 
Act does not define the word appropriate.79 Without a statutory 
definition, most courts still rely on slightly expanded versions 
of the Supreme Court’s early definition of FAPE when deciding 
whether to award a remedy.80 In 1982, the Supreme Court, in 
Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School 
District v. Rowley, interpreted the meaning of free appropriate 
public education.81 After reviewing the legislative history of the 
Act, Justice Rehnquist concluded that, while the Act requires 
school districts to provide special education and related 
services to students with disabilities, the Act does not require 
school districts to “maximize” each student’s potential.82 The 
Rowley Court held that a state satisfies the FAPE requirement 
by “providing personalized instruction with sufficient support 
services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that 
instruction.”83 The minimalist FAPE standard required by 
Rowley treats the IDEA as setting a “basic floor of opportunity” 
for students with disabilities.84 
In reaching its decision, the Rowley court set forth a 
two-step test to analyze denial of FAPE claims: 
First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the 
Act? And second, is the individualized educational program 
developed through the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to 
enable the child to receive educational benefits? If these 
  
 79 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (setting forth definitions under the IDEA). 
 80 See Lester Aron, Too Much or Not Enough: How Have the Circuit Courts 
Defined a Free Appropriate Public Education After Rowley?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 
6-7 (2005) (examining how the circuit courts are divided in interpreting the Rowley 
FAPE standard). 
 81 458 U.S. 176, 186, 203 (1982). 
 82 Id. at 198-99. 
 83 Id. at 203. 
 84 Id. at 201 (internal quotations omitted); see also Eyer, supra note 3, at 622 
(arguing the Rowley FAPE standard “set the tone for low expectations and minimal 
compliance by educational agencies”). In describing the Rowley FAPE standard, the 
Sixth Circuit used an automobile analogy, stating that the Act requires the provision of 
a “serviceable Chevrolet,” but not a “Cadillac.” Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 
455, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Terry Jean Seligmann, Rowley Comes Home to 
Roost: Judicial Review of Autism Special Education Disputes, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & 
POL’Y 217, 228-29 & n.47 (2005) (collecting cases using and expanding on the 
automobile analogy). 
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requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations 
imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more.85 
The two-step test developed in Rowley thus bifurcated the 
FAPE requirement into a procedural requirement and a 
substantive requirement.86 
A. The Procedural Requirement of a FAPE 
The procedural protections of the IDEA are intended to 
ensure that parents have a voice in their child’s educational 
placement.87 The procedural safeguards conferred on parents of 
students with disabilities were explicitly outlined by Congress 
in the IDEA.88 In Rowley, the Supreme Court recognized that 
Congress “placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance 
with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure 
of participation at every stage of the administrative 
process . . . as it did upon the measurement of the resulting 
IEP against a substantive standard.”89  
A school can be found to have denied a student a FAPE 
on procedural grounds if it failed to adhere to the IDEA’s 
procedural requirements, resulting in harm to the student.90 A 
number of courts have found that procedural violations alone 
are sufficient to establish a denial of a FAPE.91 For example, 
the Fourth Circuit held that a school district denied a student a 
FAPE when it decided to move a student from a residential 
facility to a public school and then developed a post-hoc IEP to 
reflect this decision.92 Similarly, in W.G. v. Board of Trustees of 
Target Range School District No. 23, the school district proposed 
a “preexisting, predetermined program” without any input from 
the student’s general education teacher, and the school refused 
to consider any alternatives despite the parents’ objection to the 
  
 85 458 U.S. at 206-07. 
 86 See GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 33-34. 
 87 See YELL, supra note 7, at 146. 
 88 See supra Part I.B.3. 
 89 458 U.S. at 205-06. 
 90 See YELL, supra note 7, at 153. 
 91 See, e.g., Hall v. Vance Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 635 (4th Cir. 
1985) (finding that procedural violations are sufficient by themselves to establish a 
denial of a FAPE); Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that 
a student was entitled to compensatory education where a school district failed to 
provide parental notice before terminating the student’s educational placement). 
 92 Spielberg v. Henrico Cnty. Pub. Schs., 853 F.2d 256, 257, 259 (4th Cir. 
1988) (finding that the school’s “failure to follow [IDEA] procedures is sufficient to hold 
that the defendants failed to provide [the student] with a FAPE”). 
1730 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4 
IEP.93 The Ninth Circuit found that the school district “failed to 
provide [the student] with a FAPE by failing to comply with the 
specified procedures for preparing the IEP.”94  
Although procedural violations alone may be enough to 
establish a denial of a FAPE, a number of courts have found 
that mere “technical violations” that do not harm the student 
are not sufficient to establish a denial of a FAPE.95 The First 
Circuit, in Roland M. v. Concord School Committee, summarized 
the general rule: “Before an IEP is set aside, there must be some 
rational basis to believe that procedural inadequacies 
compromised the pupil’s right to an appropriate education, 
seriously hampered the parents’ opportunity to participate in 
the formulation process, or caused a deprivation of educational 
benefits.”96 Therefore, a procedural violation does not 
automatically result in a denial of a FAPE, but courts are likely 
to find a denial of a FAPE if the procedural violations have 
adversely affected the student’s education or impeded the 
parent from participating in the IEP process.97 
In the 2004 amendments to the IDEA, Congress 
clarified what types of procedural violations can amount to a 
denial of a FAPE, essentially adopting a rule that reflects the 
test used in Roland M.98 However, even if a court finds that a 
school district has complied with the IDEA’s procedural 
mandates, the court may still find a denial of a FAPE if the 
school has not met the IDEA’s substantive requirement—
supplying the student with some educational benefit.99 
  
 93 W.G. v. Bd. of Trs., 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 94 Id. at 1487. In a similar case, the Ninth Circuit also found a procedural 
violation meriting the vacation of the district court’s summary judgment order in favor 
of the school district where a school district failed to ensure that a student’s general 
education teacher attended the IEP meeting. See M.L. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 
634, 651 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 95 See YELL, supra note 7, at 153. 
 96 Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d. 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 97 See W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484 (internal citations omitted). 
 98 See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. 
L. No. 108-446, § 615(f)(3)(E)(ii), 118 Stat. 2647, 2722 (codified as amended at 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii) (2006)) (“In matters alleging a procedural violation, a hearing 
officer may find that a child did not receive a free appropriate public education only if 
the procedural inadequacies (I) impeded the child’s right to a free appropriate public 
education; (II) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the 
decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education 
to the parents’ child; or (III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.”). 
 99 See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982); see also infra Part II.B. 
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B. The Substantive Requirement of a FAPE 
While the Rowley court only required school districts to 
supply some educational benefit to students with disabilities, 
later decisions have required more of school districts.100 Cases 
decided shortly after the Rowley decision tended to give a strict 
interpretation to the Rowley requirement, finding that an IEP 
was appropriate as long as it conferred some benefit.101 In later 
cases, however, courts began to apply various standards that 
required more than a superficial benefit.102 
For example, in Polk v. Central Susquehanna 
Intermediate Unit 16, the Third Circuit held that the IDEA 
requires “more than a trivial educational benefit.”103 The 
student in Polk had severe mental and physical disabilities, but 
the school district refused to provide any students with 
physical therapy.104 The district court granted summary 
judgment for the school district, finding that the student’s 
educational plan, under the Rowley standard, resulted in “some 
educational benefit,” even if he was not receiving certain 
related services.105 The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the 
district court had applied the Rowley standard out of context.106 
The Third Circuit relied on both the Rowley decision 
and the legislative history of the IDEA to reach its conclusion 
that a student’s IEP must be formulated to provide the student 
with a “meaningful benefit.”107 After carefully reviewing the 
history of the IDEA, the court determined that “[j]ust as 
Congress did not write a blank check, neither did it anticipate 
that states would engage in the idle gesture of providing 
special education designed to confer only trivial benefit.”108 The 
Third Circuit explained that because the student in Rowley had 
  
 100 See, e.g., Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (“When students display considerable intellectual potential, IDEA requires 
‘a great deal more than a negligible [benefit].’” (quoting Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna 
Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 1988))). 
 101 See, e.g., Doe v. Lawson, 579 F. Supp. 1314, 1319 (D. Mass. 1984) (stating 
that the question is whether the “program will provide some educational benefit”). 
 102 Huefner, supra note 13, at 368 (“Lower court standards varied, but over time, 
most courts looked at the student’s IEP and decided that trivial progress toward IEP goals 
was insufficient and that progress should be ‘meaningful,’ ‘satisfactory,’ or ‘adequate.’”). 
 103 853 F.2d at 180. 
 104 Id. at 172. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 184. 
 108 Id. 
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received a substantial benefit from her education, the Rowley 
court did not have the opportunity to fully examine what level 
of benefit was required by the IDEA.109 The Polk court rejected 
the view that the “some benefit” standard in Rowley was 
equivalent to “any benefit at all.”110 According to Polk, the IDEA 
requires school districts to do more than merely provide 
students with a “de minimis benefit.”111 
Courts have struggled with the application of the 
“meaningful benefit” standard, relying on various factors to 
measure the level of benefit provided by an IEP.112 Because the 
courts are wary of “‘meddling in state educational 
methodology,’” they will look for “‘objective evidence’ indicating 
whether the child is likely to make progress or regress under 
the proposed plan.”113 In order to measure progression or 
regression, courts will consider whether the student is 
attaining passing marks and advancing from grade to grade.114 
This standard is not always an honest measurement of 
educational benefit, however, because many students with 
disabilities, especially those in an inclusion setting, will 
advance from grade to grade despite the lack of any meaningful 
progress.115 In addition to looking at a student’s grades and 
regular advancement, some courts have turned to standardized 
  
 109 Id. at 180. 
 110 Id. at 183. 
 111 Id. at 182. 
 112 See YELL, supra note 7, at 155 (explaining that courts do not have a 
“precise definition to follow when determining whether the education offered is 
meaningful or trivial,” but that “[t]his lack of precision appears appropriate because 
what constitutes a meaningful education to particular students can only be ascertained 
on a case-by-case basis”). 
 113 Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1121 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
 114 Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 n.28 (1982) (“When the 
handicapped child is being educated in the regular classrooms of a public school 
system, the achievement of passing marks and advancement from grade to grade will 
be one important factor in determining educational benefit.”). 
 115 See Huefner, supra note 13, at 370 (arguing that the Supreme Court in 
Rowley did not anticipate the inclusion movement and the fact that many students 
with disabilities in the inclusion setting are “often advanced with their chronological 
peers while not performing academically at grade level”); see also Straube v. Fla. Union 
Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp. 1164, 1176-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The record suggests that we 
cannot totally rely on the Rowley standard to assess the educational benefit derived by 
[the student] because the continual decrease in his grades and the failure of his 
reading level to move up in six years suggests that perhaps [the student] was being 
moved from grade to grade in order to get him through the system.”). 
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test scores as a metric of progress.116 Regardless of the standard 
employed by the court, a student’s “progress must be viewed in 
light of the limitations imposed by the child’s disability.”117 
While it is clear that some courts will require a school to 
provide a student with disabilities a program that confers some 
“meaningful benefit,” it is less clear what measurement 
standard courts will use to determine the level of benefit.118 
Given the confusion over what constitutes satisfactory 
progress under the IDEA, commentators have urged courts to 
adopt various standards for determining whether a student has 
been denied a FAPE.119 Some commentators have argued that 
courts should adopt a per se approach for determining denials 
of FAPE.120 Under a per se approach, a failure to implement any 
part of an IEP would constitute a denial of a FAPE.121 The 
argument is that when the parties have agreed to an IEP, the 
courts are not in the position to determine what portions of 
that IEP are material.122 While the per se approach comports 
with the IDEA’s extensive procedural protections that go 
toward developing a student’s IEP,123 many courts have rejected 
it, electing instead to apply a material failure standard.124 
Others have argued that courts should adopt a FAPE 
standard that better reflects Congress’s emphasis on the IEP,125 
  
 116 See, e.g., K.C. v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 1:03-CV-3501-TWT, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 47652, at *48-49 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2006) (finding that a student’s IEP 
reports, grades, and standardized test scores all indicated “adequate academic progress”). 
 117 Mrs. B., 103 F.3d at 1121 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202). 
 118 See Aron, supra note 80, at 7 (“[S]ix Circuit Courts of Appeals apply the 
‘meaningful benefit’ standard, five apply a lesser standard in the nature of ‘adequate 
benefit’ or ‘some benefit,’ and one appears to apply a mixture of both.”). 
 119 See, e.g., Ferster, supra note 13, at 103 (advocating for a per se approach); 
Huefner, supra note 13, at 379 (advocating for a standard requiring “substantial 
progress” towards IEP goals). 
 120 Ferster, supra note 13, at 103. 
 121 Id. at 92. 
 122 See Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 827 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(Ferguson, J., dissenting). 
 123 See Ferster, supra note 13, at 103; see also supra Part I.B.2. 
 124 See, e.g., Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 822 (“[W]e hold that a material failure to 
implement an IEP violates the IDEA.”); Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 
F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e conclude that to prevail on a claim under the 
IDEA, a party challenging the implementation of an IEP must show more than a de 
minimis failure to implement all elements of that IEP, and, instead, must demonstrate 
that the school board or other authorities failed to implement substantial or significant 
provisions of the IEP.”). 
 125 See Dixie Snow Huefner, Judicial Review of the Special Educational Program 
Requirements Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act: Where Have We Been 
and Where Should We Be Going?, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 483, 502 (1991) (“A process 
anchored more tightly to the IEP might have produced the same result in Rowley while 
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as well as the various amendments to the IDEA that stress the 
importance of measuring a student’s progress towards her 
individual IEP goals.126 This IEP-focused FAPE standard would 
require courts to consider whether a student has made 
“substantial progress toward at least a significant [number] of 
the [IEP] goals.”127 Tying the FAPE determination to the 
demonstrated level of progress towards IEP goals would result 
in more judicial attention to the carefully crafted IEP 
requirements detailed in the IDEA.128 
Adopting an IEP-centric FAPE standard could greatly 
reduce some of the confusion surrounding compensatory 
educational services awards. As a first step, courts should 
begin to clearly enunciate when they are awarding 
“compensatory education” versus “additional services” instead 
of grouping the two remedies together under one vague title. 
Removing this simple source of ambiguity would aid courts in 
readily identifying which of these two common scenarios is 
being presented to them—namely, whether they are addressing 
the needs of a student who is protected by the IDEA or one who 
is no longer eligible.  
A version of the IEP-centered FAPE standard would be 
particularly helpful when applied to “additional services” cases, 
though perhaps less functional in “compensatory education” 
cases. In the context of “additional services” cases, where the 
student is still protected by the IDEA, courts should look to the 
student’s IEP goals, objectives, and assessment data to 
  
offering guidance as to how benefit is to be measured for other students.”); see also supra 
notes 60-68 and accompanying text (outlining IEP requirements). 
 126 See Huefner, supra note 13, at 373 (arguing that many courts have failed 
to reconsider the substantive Rowley standard “despite the clear emphasis on 
measurable progress since the 1997 amendments”); see also Huefner, supra note 78, at 
196-98 (comparing the 1990 and 1997 versions of the IDEA IEP requirements). The 
1997 amendments to the IDEA require IEPs to contain goals that are “measurable,” as 
well as “[a] statement of . . . how . . . progress toward the . . . goals . . . will be 
measured.” Id. at 127 (final alteration in original); see also Scott F. Johnson, 
Reexamining Rowley: A New Focus in Special Education Law, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 
561, 580 (2003) (arguing that the 1997 amendments to the IDEA “incorporate the high 
expectations of state educational standards into the programming for disabled 
students” and that these amendments “show that FAPE is now more than access to a 
basic floor of opportunity”). 
 127 Huefner, supra note 13, at 379. 
 128 See supra Part I.B.2. Additionally, changing to an IEP-centered FAPE 
standard that focuses on measurable progress is in accord with the prevailing view 
that Congress, through the 1997 and 2004 amendments to the IDEA, “has raised the 
‘floor of opportunity’ to ensure high expectations for educational achievement, 
participation in the general curriculum and preparation for independent living in 
adulthood.” Ferster, supra note 13, at 83-84. 
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determine (1) whether the student is making sufficient 
progress towards her IEP goals and, if not, (2) whether the 
school has taken steps to appropriately revise the IEP goals, 
extend special education services, or improve instructional 
methods to address the lack of progress.129 Using this standard, 
courts could better isolate the problem by identifying the lack 
of progress towards specific IEP goals, which they can remedy 
by crafting individually tailored “additional services” awards. 
For example, if a court finds that a student is not making 
adequate progress towards IEP goals and objectives related to 
reading, it can award the student “additional services” in the 
form of literacy tutoring.130 This approach would reduce 
confusion (and thereby the need for expensive litigation), while 
also guiding the courts and administrative hearing officers in 
crafting appropriate, narrowly tailored remedies that address 
the individual student’s unique needs.  
The IEP-centered approach, however, may be less 
appropriate in the “compensatory education” context where the 
student is no longer protected by the IDEA because of age or 
graduation status. In these cases, a more general but stricter 
FAPE standard should be applied because of the exceptional 
nature of the “compensatory education” remedy, which forces a 
school district to fund a student’s education past her twenty-
first birthday.131 
  
 129 See Huefner, supra note 125, at 508 (advocating for the use of IEP goals and 
objectives as “reference points” in evaluating whether the student is receiving a FAPE). 
Under Huefner’s IEP-centered approach, evidence of trivial progress or regression toward 
IEP objectives “would be indications either that the goals and objectives, the special 
education services, or the methods and materials were inappropriate.” Id. 
 130 This approach requires that the school district has complied with the IDEA’s 
IEP requirements—specifically, that the school district has provided the student with an 
IEP that contains measurable and appropriate annual goals given the student’s present 
level of functioning. See supra Part I.B.2. For example, a measurable annual goal might 
read: “Given a text passage of between 250 and 400 words at a sixth grade reading level, 
Curtis will read the passage aloud with 95-100% accuracy in three consecutive weekly 
trials.” Curtis’ Sample IEP, IEP QUALITY PROJECT, https://iepq.education.illinois.edu/ 
documents/studentscenarios/curtis/Curtis_IEP.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). If the IEP 
goals are not measurable or not appropriate given the student’s present level of 
functioning, the court should require the creation of a new IEP that contains appropriate 
and measurable goals. See Huefner, supra note 125, at 512 (arguing that school 
districts should have the burden of demonstrating that the IEP contains measurable 
goals designed to address the student’s needs). Arguably, courts should adopt a rule 
that an IEP that lacks measurable goals is per se inappropriate. See 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II) (2006) (requiring IEPs to contain “measurable annual goals” that 
meet the student’s needs and “enable[s] the child to be involved in and make progress 
in the general . . . curriculum”); see also supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text 
(discussing per se FAPE standard). 
 131 See infra Part III.B. 
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III. REMEDIES AVAILABLE UNDER THE IDEA 
Once a student has been found to have been denied a 
FAPE—for procedural reasons, substantive reasons, or both—
the hearing officer or court must devise an appropriate remedy. 
The IDEA does not expressly enumerate the forms of relief 
available to remedy a denial of a FAPE, but instead simply 
provides that courts can grant “such relief as the court determines 
is appropriate.”132 Resolving which remedies are “appropriate” is a 
job that has largely been left to the courts,133 and the Supreme 
Court has made it clear that courts have “broad discretion” in 
fashioning relief.134 Courts and administrative hearing officers 
have granted injunctive relief,135 monetary damages,136 tuition 
reimbursement,137 compensatory education,138 additional services,139 
and attorneys’ fees140 to remedy denials of FAPE.  
A. Tuition Reimbursement 
Much of the confusion surrounding compensatory 
educational services is due to the irregular evolution of the two 
remedies, which both have their roots in the tuition 
reimbursement remedy approved by the Supreme Court in 
  
 132 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). 
 133 See YELL, supra note 7, at 294. 
 134 Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985). 
 135 See, e.g., Taylor v. Honig, 910 F.2d 627, 633 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming injunction). 
 136 Compare Cappillino v. Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 40 F. Supp. 2d. 513, 
515-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (allowing a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a 
violation of the IDEA), and Emma C. v. Eastin, 985 F. Supp. 940, 945 (N.D. Cal. 1997) 
(same), and Walker v. District of Columbia, 157 F. Supp. 2d 11, 30 (D.D.C. 2001) 
(allowing compensatory damages for violations of the IDEA, but only in extraordinary 
circumstances), with Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 
F.3d 176, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2009) (compensatory and punitive damages not available under 
the IDEA), and Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (same). For a 
discussion of monetary damages under the IDEA, see Seligmann, supra note 35. 
 137 See, e.g., Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369 (allowing for tuition reimbursement); 
see also infra Part III.A. 
 138 See, e.g., Miener ex rel. Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 
1986) (allowing for compensatory education awards); see also infra Part III.B. 
 139 See, e.g., Application of the Bd. of Educ., Appeal No. 06-040 (N.Y. State 
Educ. Dep’t June 19, 2006), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2006/06-040.htm 
(awarding additional services); see also infra Part III.C. 
 140 See, e.g., A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 
2005) (upholding an award of attorneys’ fees for the prevailing party in an IDEA 
administrative hearing). The IDEA expressly provides for awards of attorneys’ fees. See 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006). While the IDEA permits attorneys’ fees awards, the 
Supreme Court has held that the IDEA does not allow prevailing parents to recover the 
costs of experts or consultants. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 
548 U.S. 291, 300 (2006). 
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Burlington School Committee v. Department of Education.141 Prior 
to Burlington, a commonly litigated issue was whether parents 
who unilaterally placed their child in a private school could seek 
reimbursement under the IDEA if they established that the 
public school placement was inappropriate.142 Pre-Burlington 
courts and hearing officers often refused to award tuition 
reimbursement if the parents acted unilaterally, unless the 
parent could prove bad faith on the part of the school district.143  
In Burlington, the parents sought tuition reimbursement 
after unilaterally placing their child in a private school because 
they believed that the proposed public school setting was 
inappropriate.144 The Supreme Court unanimously held that 
parents could seek private school tuition reimbursement under 
the IDEA from the school district if the school failed to provide 
the child with an appropriate IEP.145 Distinguishing tuition 
reimbursement from a damages award, Justice Rehnquist 
clarified that “[r]eimbursement merely requires the Town to 
belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along and 
would have borne in the first instance had it developed a 
proper IEP.”146 
After Burlington, the question remained as to whether 
parents could be reimbursed for private schools that did not 
meet the state’s educational standards.147 The Supreme Court 
answered that question affirmatively in Florence County School 
District Four v. Carter, finding that a parent’s “failure to select 
a program known to be approved by the State in favor of an 
unapproved option is not itself a bar to reimbursement.”148 The 
Carter court clarified that parents are not held to the same 
  
 141 471 U.S. 359 (1985). 
 142 GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 231-32. 
 143 See Eugene B. Jr. v. Great Neck Union Free Sch. Dist., 635 F. Supp. 753, 
756 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“In the view of both the Commissioner and the hearing officer, 
plaintiffs were not entitled to tuition reimbursement because they acted unilaterally in 
enrolling [the student] in the Lowell School and there were no ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ or ‘unique factual situations’ warranting an award of tuition in the face 
of such unilateral placement.”). 
 144 471 U.S. at 362. 
 145 Id. at 369. 
 146 Id. at 370-71. 
 147 ROTHSTEIN & JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 334. Some courts had refused to 
award relief if the private school was not approved by the state education agency. See, 
e.g., Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 642 (2d Cir. 1988) (concluding that the court 
could not award a placement at an unapproved private school). 
 148 510 U.S. 7, 14 (1993). 
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FAPE standard in selecting a private school.149 Therefore, 
parents seeking tuition reimbursement are only required to 
establish that the public school system did not offer a FAPE 
and that the private school is appropriate.150 
In later amendments to the IDEA, Congress clarified a 
number of issues that had arisen before and after the Burlington 
and Carter decisions.151 The right to tuition reimbursement, 
along with specified limitations on the remedy, is now expressly 
provided for in the IDEA and the federal regulations.152 Tuition 
reimbursement may be reduced or denied if the parents did not 
provide adequate notice to the school district, or if a court finds 
that the parents acted unreasonably.153 
Despite the clarification provided by the new federal 
regulations, courts still struggled with the issue of whether 
students who were not previously enrolled in special education 
services in a public school could receive tuition reimbursement.154 
Initially, the circuit courts were split on the issue.155 In Greenland 
School District v. Amy N., the First Circuit found that “tuition 
reimbursement is only available for children who have previously 
received ‘special education and related services.’”156 The Second 
Circuit, in contrast, concluded that students who had not 
previously received special education services from the public 
school system were not precluded from seeking tuition 
reimbursement.157 The Supreme Court, in Forest Grove School 
District v. T.A., resolved the circuit split, holding that tuition 
  
 149 Id. at 13 (finding that the requirements in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)(A) (now 
§ 1401(9)) “do not make sense in the context of a parental placement”). 
 150 See id.; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c) (2010). 
 151 ROTHSTEIN & JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 334-35. 
 152 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(d) (outlining the 
limitations on reimbursement); see also Lewis M. Wasserman, Reimbursement to 
Parents of Tuition and Other Costs Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act of 2004, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 171, 201-06 (2006). 
 153 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(d). Reimbursement may be reduced or denied if the 
parents do not notify the school district at the most recent IEP meeting that they are 
rejecting the public placement and enrolling their child in a private school at public 
expense, or if the parents fail to provide written notice to the school district at least ten 
days before removing their child. Id. 
 154 ROTHSTEIN & JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 335. 
 155 GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 233-34. 
 156 358 F.3d 150, 159 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 157 Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 368 (2d Cir. 2006). The Eleventh 
Circuit also gave a broad interpretation to the availability of tuition reimbursement. 
See M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd., 437 F.3d 1085, 1099 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e conclude 
that parents are not required in all cases to first enroll their child in public school 
pursuant to an inadequate IEP in order to preserve their right to reimbursement.”). 
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reimbursement was an available remedy even for students who 
had not previously received special education services.158  
While the decision in Forest Grove was considered a 
victory for parents of special education students,159 the remedy 
of tuition reimbursement is generally not a viable option for 
low-income families that cannot afford the up-front financial 
burden of enrolling their children in costly private programs.160 
Parents who unilaterally place their children in private school 
run the risk that reimbursement will be limited or denied 
altogether.161 Because of these risks, many parents will forgo 
the option of tuition reimbursement and rely on compensatory 
remedies instead.162  
B. Compensatory Education  
Compensatory education has been a particularly 
important remedy for families unable to afford the “up front” 
risks of unilaterally enrolling their child in a private school.163 
As it evolved into a more developed and accepted remedy, it 
became the “coin of the realm” in cases arising under the 
IDEA.164 In general, compensatory education is designed to 
remedy past denials of FAPE by making up for lost educational 
progress.165 Compensatory education can be comprised of 
extended-day programming, summer school, tutoring, or other 
  
 158 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2009) (“The IDEA authorizes reimbursement for the 
cost of private special-education services when a school district fails to provide a FAPE 
and the private-school placement is appropriate, regardless of whether the child 
previously received special education or related services through the public school.”). 
Prior to Forest Grove, an equally divided Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, 
affirmed a Second Circuit decision authorizing tuition reimbursement for students who 
had not previously received special education services. See Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F., 552 
U.S. 1 (2007) (per curiam), aff’g 193 Fed. Appx. 26 (2d Cir. 2006); see also GUERNSEY & 
KLARE, supra note 1, at 234. 
 159 Natalie Pyong Kocher, Note, Lost in Forest Grove: Interpreting IDEA’s 
Inherent Paradox, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 333, 348 (2010) (“Forest Grove is viewed 
as a victory for parents of children with disabilities who may now seek reimbursement 
for private school tuition, even if their child never attended a public school.”). 
 160 Emily Blumberg, Comment, Recent Development: Forest Grove School 
District v. T.A., 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 163, 176 (2010). In Burlington, the Court 
noted that “parents who unilaterally change their child’s placement during the pendency 
of review proceedings, without the consent of state or local school officials, do so at their 
own financial risk.” Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 373-74 (1985). 
 161 GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 234. 
 162 Blumberg, supra note 160, at 165. 
 163 Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedy of Compensatory Education Under the IDEA, 
95 ED. L. REP. 483, 483 (1995). 
 164 Id. 
 165 See YELL, supra note 7, at 300. 
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related services.166 The evolution of the remedy has created 
uncertainty over the availability of the remedy and the proper 
standard for calculating awards. 
1. The Evolution of the Compensatory Education 
Remedy 
The remedy of compensatory education grew out of the 
tuition reimbursement remedy authorized by the Supreme 
Court in Burlington.167 Prior to Burlington, some courts had 
expressed concerns about granting awards of compensatory 
education, viewing the remedy as dangerously similar to a 
damages award.168 Perceiving compensatory education as 
indistinguishable from damages, some courts adopted the 
Seventh Circuit’s reasoning as laid out in Anderson v. 
Thompson, which held that damages are generally not 
available under the Act.169 In Anderson, the Seventh Circuit 
reviewed the legislative history of the Act and concluded that it 
was “intended in most cases to provide only injunctive relief as 
a final procedural safeguard that would ensure an appropriate 
educational program for a handicapped child.”170 The court 
concluded that Congress had decided to ensure that students 
with disabilities would receive appropriate educations through 
an “elaborate system of procedural safeguards,” rather than 
through compensatory relief.171  
  
 166 See id. 
 167 Antonis Katsiyannis & John W. Maag, Ensuring Appropriate Education: 
Emerging Remedies, Litigation, Compensation, and Other Legal Considerations, 63 
EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 451, 458 (1997); see also supra Part III.A. Some commentators 
have described the compensatory education remedy as a “poor man’s Burlington.” 
Deborah A. Mattison & Stewart R. Hakola, Availability of Damages and Equitable 
Remedies Under the IDEA, Section 504, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 7 INDIVIDUALS 
WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 1, 2 (Special Report No. 7, 1992). 
 168 See, e.g., Powell v. Defore, 699 F.2d 1078, 1081-82 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Any 
relief sought in the nature of compensatory education is the same as a claim for 
damages.”); Miener v. Missouri., 498 F. Supp. 949, 951 (E.D. Mo. 1980), aff’d in part 
and rev’d in part, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1982), rev’d in part, 800 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 
1986); Alexopulos v. Riles, 784 F.2d 1408, 1412 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that 
compensatory education is not a form of equitable relief, but more like a damages 
award); but see Campbell v. Talladega Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 56 (N.D. 
Ala. 1981) (awarding two years of education past the student’s twenty-first birthday to 
remedy a previous denial of a FAPE). 
 169 Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1209-10 (7th Cir. 1981); Miener v. 
Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 979 (8th Cir. 1982) (partially adopting reasoning of Anderson); 
but see Cappillino v. Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 40 F. Supp. 2d. 513, 515-16 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999) (allowing a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the IDEA). 
 170 Anderson, 658 F.2d at 1210. 
 171 Id. at 1212. 
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Despite finding that the statute did not generally allow 
for damages, the court, in dicta, outlined two “exceptional 
circumstances in which a limited damages award might be 
appropriate.”172 According to Anderson, a limited damages 
award173 might be appropriate if (1) the child’s physical health 
would otherwise be endangered,174 or (2) if the school district 
acted in bad faith.175 While some courts adopted Anderson’s 
exceptional circumstances exceptions,176 other courts criticized 
the Anderson court for failing to distinguish general damages 
from tuition reimbursement.177 Courts deciding the issue after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington determined that 
  
 172 Id. at 1213. 
 173 In a footnote, the Anderson court clarified that tort liability damages would 
never be appropriate, only damages to compensate parents for the “costs of obtaining 
services that the school district was required to provide.” Id. at 1213 n.12. 
 174 Id. at 1213-14 (“Congress, which so explicitly expressed its concern for the 
needs and rights of handicapped children, could not have intended a child to remain in 
a placement in which there was a serious risk of injury to that child’s physical 
health.”). The court carved out this exception by relying on Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 
968 (N.D. Tex. 1981). In Tatro, the school district refused to provide catheterization for 
a student with spinal bifida and so the parents placed the student in a private center. 
Id. at 970-71, 978. The court did not decide whether damages were generally available, 
but simply concluded that when “parents cannot enroll the child without a risk of 
injury to the child because a school will not provide a required related service, 
appropriate relief ought to include the cost of alternative sources of education and 
therapy.” Id. at 978. 
 175 Anderson, 658 F.2d at 1214 (“A second exceptional circumstance would 
exist when the defendant has acted in bad faith by failing to comply with the 
procedural provisions . . . in an egregious fashion.”). The Anderson court further 
explained the second exception to the general rule that damages are unavailable under 
the Act: 
Congress could not have intended, however, that parents would keep their 
child in an inappropriate situation in a case in which the school district was 
acting in bad faith. In those circumstances, most parents could and likely 
would arrange unilaterally for the appropriate services. Should the parents 
finally prevail in their judicial action, in those circumstances money damages 
for the cost of these services should be awarded. 
Id. 
 176 See, e.g., Gregg B. v. Bd. of Educ., 535 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(“Such reasoning appears sound to this court.”); Powell v. Defore, 699 F.2d 1078, 1081 
(11th Cir. 1983) (implying it would adopt the Anderson exceptional circumstances test); 
Dep’t of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 817 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying and expanding 
the Anderson exceptional circumstances test); see also Mark H. Van Pelt, Comment, 
Compensatory Educational Services and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 
1984 WIS. L. REV. 1469, 1471 n.8 (1984) (collecting cases adopting the Anderson test). 
 177 Doe v. Anrig, 561 F. Supp. 121, 127 (D. Mass. 1983) (“In this court’s opinion, 
with respect, the Anderson court failed adequately to note the difference between general 
damages, which could be a very serious matter, and reimbursement for tuition payments 
that would have been the town’s responsibility under the appropriate IEP.”). 
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the Anderson test was too restrictive for determining when 
reimbursement was appropriate.178 
Although the Burlington decision was decided in the 
context of tuition reimbursement,179 the decision had a direct 
impact on the future of compensatory education.180 Before 
Burlington, the Eighth Circuit, in Miener v. Missouri, adopted 
the Anderson view that “‘appropriate’ relief was generally 
intended to be restricted to injunctive relief, within which the 
district judge would have wide latitude to fashion an 
individualized educational program for the child.”181 In Miener, 
the school district evaluated the student and found that she had 
severe learning disabilities and behavioral disorders stemming 
from a reoccurring brain tumor, but did not provide her with 
special education services.182 Unable to afford any private 
options, the student’s father enrolled her in a state hospital and 
sought compensatory educational services to remedy the denial 
of a FAPE spanning her three-year hospitalization.183  
The district court dismissed the claims for compensatory 
education, holding that a private right for damages could not be 
implied from the Act.184 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal 
of the compensatory education claim on Eleventh Amendment 
grounds, but reversed and remanded the case back to the district 
court to decide other issues.185 By the time the case reached the 
Court of Appeals for a second time, the Burlington decision had 
come down and the father reasserted the compensatory education 
claim in light of the Supreme Court’s decision.186 The defendants 
argued that compensatory education did not fall within the new 
Burlington framework because compensatory education, unlike 
tuition reimbursement, did not seek to recompense the parents 
  
 178 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Florida, 815 F.2d 629, 631 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Anderson 
presents too restrictive a test to determine the appropriateness of reimbursement as a 
remedy.”). 
 179 See 471 U.S. 359, 363 (1985); see also supra Part III.A. 
 180 See Katsiyannis & Maag, supra note 167, at 458 (explaining that several of 
the Courts of Appeals have “extended the Supreme Court’s rationale in Burlington to 
support the award of compensatory education”). 
 181 Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 979 (8th Cir. 1982). Although the Eighth 
Circuit adopted the Anderson view, it declined to adopt the Anderson exceptions. Id. at 
980 (“We depart from the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, however, insofar as that court in 
dictum recognized two exceptional circumstances in which a limited damage award 
might be appropriate.”). 
 182 Miener ex rel. Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 183 Id. at 751-52. 
 184 Miener v. Missouri, 498 F. Supp. 949, 951 (E.D. Mo. 1980). 
 185 Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 983 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 186 Miener ex rel. Miener, 800 F.2d at 751. 
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for previous educational expenses.187 The Eighth Circuit soundly 
rejected this argument, stating: 
We cannot agree with the defendants that they should escape 
liability for these services simply because [the parent] was unable to 
provide them in the first instance; we believe that such a result 
would be consistent neither with Burlington nor with congressional 
intent. Like the retroactive reimbursement in Burlington, imposing 
liability for compensatory educational services on the defendants 
“merely requires [them] to belatedly pay expenses that [they] should 
have paid all along.” Here, as in Burlington, recovery is necessary to 
secure the child’s right to a free appropriate public education. We are 
confident that Congress did not intend the child’s entitlement to a 
free education to turn upon her parent’s ability to “front” its costs.188 
Following the Burlington and Miener decisions, courts began to 
adopt compensatory education as an “appropriate” remedy 
available for students who had been denied a FAPE.189 Courts 
reasoned that Congress would not have intended the 
availability of a remedy to depend on a parent’s ability to front 
the costs of private education.190 
Even the U.S. Department of Education has now 
recognized the importance of compensatory education as an 
available remedy under the IDEA.191 In 1990, in response to an 
inquiry, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Special 
Education Programs (OSEP) stated its position on 
compensatory education as an available remedy.192 Citing the 
Miener decision, the OSEP stated that it recognized 
compensatory education as a remedy for a denial of a FAPE.193 
It also stressed that compensatory education is an especially 
  
 187 Id. at 753. 
 188 Id. (quoting Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370-71 
(1985)). 
 189 See, e.g., Pihl v. Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 188-89 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(relying on Miener’s extension of Burlington to award compensatory education); Hall v. 
Knott Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 941 F.2d 402, 406-07 (6th Cir. 1991) (same); Lester H. v. 
Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872-73 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Burr v. Ambach, 863 F.2d 1071, 
1078 (2d Cir. 1988), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Sobol v. Burr, 
492 U.S. 902 (1989), reaff’d, 888 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Breen, 853 F.2d 853, 857-58 (11th Cir. 1988) (same). 
 190 Lester H., 916 F.2d at 872-73 (“[W]e conclude that Congress, by allowing 
the courts to fashion an appropriate remedy to cure the deprivation of a child’s right to 
a free appropriate public education, did not intend to offer a remedy only to those 
parents able to afford an alternative private education.”). 
 191 See OSEP Policy Letter, 17 E.H.L.R. 522, 522-23 (U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Office 
of Special Educ. Programs, Feb. 13, 1990). 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. at 523. 
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important remedy for parents who cannot afford appropriate 
private placements for their children.194 
2. Compensatory Education: Confusion over Age Limits 
and Award Calculations 
While compensatory education became widely accepted 
as an available remedy, courts differed on whether such an 
award could exceed the IDEA’s age limit.195 The IDEA provides 
that states must generally provide a FAPE to all students with 
disabilities between the ages of three and twenty-one, with a 
few exceptions.196 Some courts read this statutory age limit as a 
bar to any compensatory education awards that required a 
school district to provide educational services beyond the age 
twenty-one.197  
In 1988, the Supreme Court, in Honig v. Doe, adopted the 
position that the statutory protections of the Act did not extend 
past age twenty-one.198 The circuit courts, however, have declined 
to read the Honig decision as relevant in the compensatory 
education setting.199 The First Circuit, in Pihl v. Massachusetts 
Department of Education, explained the inapplicability of Honig 
in the context of compensatory education: 
The crucial difference between Honig and this case is the nature of 
the relief requested. In Honig, Doe was asking the court to make the 
school district comply with the Act in the future. But, because Doe 
was beyond the age of entitlement for services, he had no right to 
  
 194 Id. (“[C]ompensatory education may be the only means through which 
children [who] are forced to remain in an inappropriate placement due to their parents’ 
financial inability to pay for an appropriate private placement would receive FAPE.”). 
Additionally, it is the OSEP’s position that compensatory education can be awarded by 
impartial hearing officers and that the remedy can take the form of summer school 
programs. Id. 
 195 GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 237. 
 196 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B) (2006). The IDEA gives states some flexibility in 
determining whether or not to provide children between the ages of three to five and 
eighteen to twenty-one with public education. Id. It has been argued that the IDEA 
probably would not have passed without this limitation, which “recognized that the 
states themselves should have some autonomy to continue to educate certain age 
groups.” TURNBULL III, supra note 32, at 37. 
 197 See, e.g., Alexopulos v. Riles, 784 F.2d 1408, 1413 (9th Cir. 1986) (“To grant 
appellants’ request for compensatory education would require the District to continue 
providing [the student] with educational services beyond the maximum age indicated 
in the statute. This result was not intended by Congress.”). 
 198 484 U.S. 305, 318 (1988) (“[The student] is now 24 years old and, 
accordingly, is no longer entitled to the protections and benefits of the EHA, which 
limits eligibility to disabled children between the ages of 3 and 21.”). 
 199 Solomon A. Metzger, Compensatory Education Under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1839, 1862 (2002). 
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demand that the school district comply with the Act either presently 
or in the future. By contrast, Karl Pihl is asking only that the court 
compensate him for rights that he claims the school district denied 
him in the past.200 
Thus, courts have been willing to award compensatory 
education, even if the student is older than twenty-one, as long 
as the denial of a FAPE occurred while the student was 
protected by the IDEA.201 If courts strictly applied the statutory 
age limit in compensatory education cases, then school districts 
could essentially avoid providing a FAPE to students 
approaching the age limit.202  
Further adding to the confusion surrounding the 
compensatory education remedy is the fact that courts are not 
in agreement on how to calculate awards.203 Some courts apply 
an hour-for-hour formula to determine the appropriate amount 
of compensatory education to award a student who has been 
denied a FAPE.204 Other courts, however, have rejected this 
approach as overly mechanical, and instead apply a more 
flexible and individualized approach that better reflects the 
  
 200 Pihl v. Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 189 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 201 See, e.g., Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872 (3d Cir. 1990) (A student 
with disabilities who has been denied a FAPE “has the right to ask for compensation 
because the School District violated his statutory rights while he was still entitled to 
them.”). This view can also draw support from the Supreme Court’s decision in Zobrest 
v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993). In a footnote, the Supreme 
Court recognized that a “continuing controversy” exists even when a student has 
graduated from high school when the parents are seeking reimbursement for expenses 
incurred while the student was protected by the statute. Id. at 4 n.2. 
 202 Lester H., 916 F.2d at 872. The Third Circuit explained the potentially 
dangerous result of strictly applying the statutory age limit examined in Honig to 
compensatory education cases: 
If Honig stands for the proposition defendants assert, school districts would 
be immune from suit if they simply stopped educating intended beneficiaries 
of the [IDEA] at age 18 or 19. Those beneficiaries’ cases would take at least 
two years to be reviewed, and even if the reviewing courts found the school 
districts’ behavior egregious, the courts would be powerless to aid the 
intended beneficiaries because those beneficiaries would now be over age 21. 
We cannot believe that either Congress or the Supreme Court meant to allow 
a school district to withhold a disabled minor’s educational rights at age 18 or 
19 without remedy. 
Id. 
 203 Compare M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (“child is entitled to compensatory education for a period equal to the period 
of deprivation”), with Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 523 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005) (rejecting hour-for-hour “cookie-cutter approach”). 
 204 M.C., 81 F.3d at 397; Westendorp v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 273, 35 F. Supp. 
2d 1134, 1138 (D. Minn. 1998) (awarding six years of compensatory education to 
remedy a six year denial of a FAPE). 
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equitable considerations emphasized by the Supreme Court in 
Burlington and Carter.205  
In Friendship Edison Public Charter School Collegiate 
Campus v. Nesbitt, the court took a more flexible approach in 
calculating a compensatory education award.206 According to 
Nesbitt, a court should fashion an individually tailored 
“compensatory education plan” that is designed to compensate 
the student for the “grade-level progress not made . . . or 
educational benefits that did not accrue due to the loss of 
FAPE.”207 Under the grade-level approach a court would 
compare the projected grade-level progress a student would 
have made if provided with a FAPE with the actual grade-level 
progress (or regression) the student made “in spite of the denial 
of FAPE.”208 Subtracting the latter from the former yields the 
educational benefit that the student did not receive due to the 
FAPE denial.209 Finally, the court must estimate how many 
instructional hours the student requires to make up for the lost 
educational benefit.210 While the grade-level approach requires 
more evidence of past and present levels of academic and 
functional levels, along with learning rate projections based on 
the cognitive abilities of the student, the result is a more 
appropriately tailored remedy.211 Given the holistic nature of 
this award formulation, however, courts should only apply the 
grade-level approach to “compensatory education” cases, while 
using the IEP-centered approach to calculate narrower awards 
in “additional services” cases.212 
C. Additional Services  
While courts have awarded “compensatory education” to 
students both over and under the age of twenty-one,213 some 
  
 205 Reid, 401 F.3d at 523; see also supra Part III.A. 
 206 Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. Collegiate Campus v. Nesbitt, 669 F. 
Supp. 2d 80 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 207 Id. at 86. 
 208 Id. at 85. 
 209 Id. The Nesbitt opinion provides helpful formulas for estimating the 
amount of grade-level progress a student forfeited due to a lack of a FAPE. Id. 
 210 Id. at 86. 
 211 One disadvantage to this approach is that parents may have to hire 
experts to establish a student’s average learning rate and cognitive ability. 
Unfortunately, expert witness fees are not recoupable under the IDEA. See Arlington 
Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 300 (2006). 
 212 See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text. 
 213 See supra Part III.B. 
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administrative hearing officers use the term “additional services” 
to denote awards to students who are under twenty-one and still 
protected by the IDEA.214 The additional services remedy, while 
not fully developed, has taken the form of tutoring services,215 
make-up counseling services,216 and home instruction.217 
Courts that award additional services to remedy denials 
of FAPE generally do so under the guise of awarding a 
compensatory education remedy.218 Although the courts have 
not distinguished between compensatory education and 
additional services, the New York State Review Officer (SRO) 
has drawn a distinction between the two types of remedies.219 
The SRO has explained the difference between compensatory 
education and additional services as follows: 
While compensatory education is a remedy that is available to 
students who are no longer eligible for instruction, State Review 
Officers have awarded “additional services” to students who remain 
eligible to attend school and have been denied appropriate services, 
if such deprivation of instruction could be remedied through the 
provision of additional services before the student becomes ineligible 
for instruction by reason of age or graduation.220 
Although some commentators have criticized the distinction 
between compensatory education and additional services as 
“arbitrary,”221 the distinction could serve some practical 
  
 214 See, e.g., Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 08-072, 11 
(N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2008/08-
072.pdf. (distinguishing compensatory education from additional services). 
 215 Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 09-035, 13 (N.Y. 
State Educ. Dep’t Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2009/09-
035.pdf (awarding one-to-one multi-sensory reading instruction as additional services). 
 216 Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 09-044, 21 (N.Y. State 
Educ. Dep’t June 25, 2009), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2009/09-044.pdf 
(awarding additional counseling sessions to compensate for sessions not provided). 
 217 Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 08-035, 24 (N.Y. 
State Educ. Dep’t June 20, 2008), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2008/08-
035.pdf (awarding ten months of home instruction as additional services). 
 218 See, e.g., P. ex rel. Mr. and Mrs. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 
123 (2d Cir. 2008) (awarding compensatory education to a student under twenty-one); 
Student X v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-CV-2316, 2008 WL 4890440, at *24 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008) (same). 
 219 See Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 10-057, 7 (N.Y. 
State Educ. Dep’t Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2010/10-
057.pdf; see also Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 08-072, 11 (N.Y. 
State Educ. Dep’t Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2008/08-072.pdf. 
 220 Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 08-072, 11 (N.Y. State 
Educ. Dep’t Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2008/08-072.pdf. 
 221 H. Jeffery Marcus, 2008 Special Education Law Update, 188 PLI/NY 213, 
225 (May 6, 2009) (arguing that the Student X decision “should help to reinforce that the 
SRO’s arbitrary distinction between ‘additional services’ and compensatory education 
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purposes. Some courts have been operating under the 
assumption that compensatory education can only be awarded 
when the student would otherwise not be eligible for 
educational services.222 In Manchester School District v. 
Christopher B., the United States District Court for the District 
of New Hampshire explained that after thoroughly reviewing 
the compensatory education case law, it had determined that 
compensatory education had only been awarded in two 
circumstances.223 According to Christopher B., there are only 
two instances when compensatory education can be awarded: 
(1) when the student is no longer eligible for services under the 
IDEA or (2) during summer vacation.224 The court explained 
that “[t]he unifying principle behind the two forms of 
compensatory education is that both involve the provision of 
education services during time periods in which the local 
educational authority is not already obligated to provide the 
student a free appropriate education.”225 
This limited view of the availability of compensatory 
education is understandable given the definition of 
“compensatory education” that the courts have developed. For 
example, the Third Circuit has defined compensatory education 
as an award that “requires a school district to provide education 
past a child’s twenty-first birthday to make up for any earlier 
deprivation.”226 In a footnote to this definition, the Third Circuit 
recognized that compensatory education had also been awarded 
during the summer, instead of after the student’s twenty-first 
birthday.227 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has described 
compensatory education as “a judicially-constructed form of 
  
should be relegated to historical artifact”). Despite the Student X decision, the New York 
SRO continues to apply the distinction between compensatory education and additional 
services. See, e.g., Application of a Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 10-057, 7 (N.Y. 
State Educ. Dep’t Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2010/10-057.pdf 
(recognizing that Student X allows for compensatory education awards to students under 
the age twenty-one, but still distinguishing additional services). 
 222 See Manchester Sch. Dist. v. Christopher B., 807 F. Supp. 860, 868-69 
(D.N.H. 1992). 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. at 869; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 21 F. Supp. 2d 
862, 880 (N.D. Ill. 1998), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Bd. of Educ. v. Kelly E., 
207 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2000) (“A court award of compensatory education requires a 
school district to provide education either during the summer months or past a child’s 
twenty-first birthday to make up for any earlier deprivation.” (citing M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. 
Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 395 (3d Cir. 1996))). 
 226 M.C. ex rel. J.C., 81 F.3d at 395. 
 227 Id. at 395 n.3. 
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relief designed to remedy past educational failings for students 
who are no longer enrolled in public school due to their age or 
graduation.”228 Without clarification from Congress or the courts, 
this confusion is likely to continue into the future. 
IV. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS: AVOIDING CONFUSION BY 
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN FORMS OF RELIEF 
The confusion over whether compensatory education can 
be awarded to a school-age student who is still protected by the 
IDEA could be alleviated by simply distinguishing between the 
two types of compensatory educational services. To remedy 
denials of FAPE, courts and administrative hearing officers 
should award “compensatory education” to students no longer 
covered by the IDEA, while awarding “additional services” to 
students still falling under the IDEA’s protections. The failure 
to distinguish compensatory education from additional services 
has also led to confusion over what standards courts should 
apply when analyzing compensatory awards, especially in the 
Second Circuit.229 This part uses the Second Circuit’s “gross 
violation” standard as an example of the extent of the confusion 
caused by the current application of the IDEA, and proposes 
solutions to prevent such confusion and to help craft better 
remedies for disabled students. 
A. Adding to the Confusion: The Second Circuit’s “Gross 
Violation” Standard 
The Second Circuit has formulated a “gross violation” 
standard, which it applies to compensatory education cases.230 
Under the standard, compensatory education is unavailable to 
a “claimant over the age of twenty-one in the absence of ‘gross’ 
procedural violations.”231 The Second Circuit’s “gross violation” 
standard originated in the case Burr v. Ambach.232 In Burr, the 
student sought one and one-half years of compensatory 
education beyond age twenty-one to make up for services that 
  
 228 Barnett v. Memphis City Schs., 113 Fed. Appx. 124, 126 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(citing Pihl v. Mass. Dep’t of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 189 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
 229 See, e.g., Student X v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-CV-2316, 2008 WL 
4890440, at *24 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008). 
 230 See, e.g., Garro v. Connecticut, 23 F.3d 734, 737 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 231 Id. 
 232 Burr v. Ambach, 863 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1988), vacated sub nom. Sobol v. 
Burr, 422 U.S. 902 (1989), reaff’d, Burr v. Sobol, 888 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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were not provided to him during a lengthy hearing and appeal 
process.233 Since the regulations required the hearing officer to 
make a determination within forty-five days of a request and 
the decision took over a year, the court found that the federal 
regulations had been “grossly violated” and awarded the 
student compensatory education.234 
Two years later, the Second Circuit applied the “gross 
violation” standard in Mrs. C. v. Wheaton.235 In Mrs. C., the 
State of Connecticut discharged a twenty-year-old student with 
intellectual disabilities from his educational placement without 
providing any notice to his mother, who was not given the 
chance to participate in the termination decision.236 Mrs. C. 
challenged the termination decision and sought compensatory 
education, but a Connecticut hearing officer found that the 
student had consented to the termination, and thus denied 
relief.237 The district court affirmed the decision, finding that a 
student over the age of eighteen can voluntarily consent to the 
termination of his educational placement.238 The Second Circuit 
reversed, finding that the IDEA’s procedural safeguards 
require parental notice before any proposed change of 
placement, even if the child has reached the age of majority.239 
Turning to the compensatory education claim, the Mrs. C. 
court cited Burr for the proposition that compensatory education 
is proper when the IDEA regulations have been “grossly 
violated.”240 The court then highlighted the fact that the “gross 
violations” in Burr “resulted in exclusion of the student from 
school for a substantial period of time.”241 By comparison to the 
violations in Burr, the Mrs. C. court concluded that the student in 
question had properly stated a claim for compensatory education 
because the state’s procedural violations had resulted in his 
“complete exclusion from an educational placement.”242 
The Second Circuit, in Garro v. Connecticut, again 
applied the “gross violation” standard to dismiss a request for 
  
 233 Id. at 1073-74. 
 234 Id. at 1075. 
 235 Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 236 Id. at 70-71. 
 237 Id. at 71. 
 238 Id. at 72-73. 
 239 Id. at 73. 
 240 Id. at 75. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. 
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compensatory education.243 Garro arose in the context of a 
challenge to a hearing officer’s determination that a student 
was not eligible for special education.244 Without detailing the 
facts of the case, the Garro court simply stated that Garro, who 
was over twenty-one, had merely alleged “unspecified 
procedural violations of the IDEA.”245 The court concluded that 
Garro was not entitled to compensatory education “in the 
absence of ‘gross’ procedural violations.”246 
Arguably, the Second Circuit’s “gross violation” 
standard is not actually a standard at all, but merely a method 
of characterizing the facts of those cases.247 Regardless, both the 
Second Circuit and other courts have recognized the “gross 
violation” standard as the applicable rule in the Second Circuit 
for compensatory education cases.248 For example, the Third 
Circuit, in M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Central Regional School District, 
explicitly rejected the Second Circuit’s “gross violation” 
standard, finding that it was “imprecise” and “not anchored in 
the structure or text of the IDEA.”249 Furthermore, although the 
“gross violation” standard was originally applied in cases of 
procedural violations, some courts and commentators have 
generalized the Second Circuit’s rule as requiring a “gross 
violation of the IDEA.”250 
In Student X. v. New York City Department of 
Education, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
  
 243 Garro v. Connecticut, 23 F.3d 734 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 244 Id. at 736. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. at 737. 
 247 See Metzger, supra note 199, at 1860 n.111 (“The position of the Second 
Circuit is not entirely plain because the reported cases there all deal with egregious 
circumstances and it may be that the discussion of gross violations is not meant to 
state a threshold, but merely describes the facts presented.”). 
 248 See, e.g., Somoza v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 538 F.3d 106, 109 n.2 (2d Cir. 
2008) (“An award of compensatory education is appropriate only for gross violations of 
the IDEA.” (citing Garro, 23 F.3d at 737)); M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 
F.3d 389, 396 (3d Cir. 1996) (“The Second Circuit has conditioned an award of 
compensatory education on the presence of a ‘gross’ deprivation of the right to free and 
appropriate education.” (citing Garro, 23 F.3d at 737; Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 
75 (2d Cir. 1990))); Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 979 F. Supp. 147, 151 
(N.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The Second Circuit, however, allows for compensatory education for 
a child over twenty-one years where there has been a gross violation of the IDEA.” 
(citing Mrs. C., 916 F.2d at 75)). 
 249 M.C., 81 F.3d at 396. 
 250 See, e.g., Somoza, 538 F.3d at 109 n.2 (“An award of compensatory 
education is appropriate only for gross violations of the IDEA.” (citing Garro, 23 F.3d at 
737)); GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 1, at 236 n.65 (generalizing the Second Circuit’s 
rule as requiring “gross violations of the IDEA”). 
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District of New York struggled with the application of the 
Second Circuit’s “gross violation” standard.251 In Student X, the 
student was an eleven-year-old who had been diagnosed with 
autism and other health impairments, which resulted in delays 
in motor and cognitive skills.252 The parent had spent several 
years fighting the school district through the impartial hearing 
process over the provision of at-home Applied Behavioral 
Analysis (ABA) services for Student X.253 In 2006, the parent 
again challenged the student’s IEP, arguing that it was not 
“reasonably calculated” to provide Student X with a FAPE.254 
While the proceedings were pending, the district stopped 
providing Student X with the ABA at-home services.255 Although 
the court ultimately decided that the 2006 IEP provided Student 
X with a FAPE, it also found that the school district had 
wrongfully terminated the at-home ABA services in violation of 
the IDEA’s “stay-put” provision.256 The court concluded that 
Student X was entitled to compensatory education because the 
school district wrongfully denied him the at-home services.257 
In making its decision, the court first addressed the 
availability of compensatory education for students who are 
under twenty-one and still protected by the IDEA.258 The school 
district, relying on Burr and Mrs. C., had argued that Student 
X was not eligible for compensatory education because he was 
under twenty-one.259 The court rejected this argument, 
concluding that just because “earlier cases found that courts 
may award compensatory education for individuals over age 
twenty-one . . . does not preclude such an award for students 
  
 251 Student X v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-CV-2316, 2008 WL 4890440, at 
*24 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008). 
 252 Id. at *4. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. at *1. 
 255 Id. at *20. 
 256 Id. The IDEA’s “stay-put” provision provides, inter alia, that: 
[D]uring the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, 
unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, 
the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child, 
or, if applying for initial admission to a public school, shall, with the consent 
of the parents, be placed in the public school program until all such 
proceedings have been completed. 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2006); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.518 (2010) (detailing the “stay-put” 
requirement). 
 257 Student X, 2008 WL 4890440, at *23. 
 258 Id. at *24. 
 259 See id. 
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under age twenty-one.”260 Although distinguishing between the 
two compensatory remedies, and clarifying that “additional 
services” are the appropriate remedy for students under 
twenty-one, would eliminate the need for this issue to be 
litigated in other courts in the future, the court did not do so. 
The Student X court then proceeded to struggle with the 
issue of whether the “gross violation” standard should apply in 
the context of awards to students under twenty-one.261 The 
court concluded—without deciding the issue—that “regardless 
of whether a gross violation of the [IDEA] is required to merit 
compensatory education, Defendant’s unlawful termination of 
Student X’s pendency entitlement is nonetheless such a 
violation.”262 The court assumed the “gross violation” standard 
applied, but did not pronounce whether it would apply the 
standard in the future.263 Expressing concern over the vagueness 
of the “gross violation” standard, the Student X court recognized 
that the “caselaw on what constitutes a gross violation is 
sparse.”264 The court acknowledged that Student X had not been 
“completely deprived of all education” by the school district’s 
wrongful termination of his at-home ABA services, but found 
that the district’s direct violation of the IDEA’s pendency 
provision was sufficient to establish a “gross violation.”265 Thus, 
while earlier courts required a total deprivation of educational 
benefit to establish a “gross violation,”266 later courts have been 
willing to find a “gross violation” even when the student was 
receiving some educational benefit. 
This confusion shows that, in addition to distinguishing 
between compensatory education and additional services 
awards, the Second Circuit needs to clarify when, if ever, the 
“gross violation” standard applies. Arguably, this heightened 
standard has been taken out of context over the years by 
transplanting it from purely procedural settings into cases 
turning on substantive denials of FAPE. Even in the 
procedural context, however, the “gross violation” standard 
  
 260 Id. 
 261 Id. at *24-25. 
 262 Id. at *24. 
 263 Id. at *24-25. 
 264 Id. at *25. 
 265 Id. (“Defendant ignored the plain language of the statute and regulations 
and deprived Student X of services to which Student X was unequivocally entitled 
regardless of the merits of his case. The court finds this a gross violation of the [IDEA].”). 
 266 See Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1990); see also supra notes 
241-242 and accompanying text. 
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appears to conflict with the evolving spirit and purpose of the 
IDEA.267 While compensatory education cases deserve a more 
stringent standard than additional services cases, courts 
should not allow school districts to escape liability through a 
heightened “gross violation” standard. Instead, given 
Congress’s emphasis on procedural safeguards, courts should 
adopt a standard that comports with the 2004 IDEA 
amendments to assess whether the school district substantially 
complied with the procedural requirements of the IDEA.268 
Even after deciding that Student X was entitled to a 
compensatory remedy, the court struggled with the calculation 
of an appropriate award.269 Although crafting an award under 
the IDEA depends on “equitable considerations,” the Second 
Circuit has not articulated a method for computing 
compensatory awards.270 In the end, the court decided to award 
Student X compensatory relief in a mechanical fashion: 
“Defendant is ordered to fund and provide ten hours per week 
of at-home ABA and five hours per week of speech and 
language therapy, for fifty-seven weeks, the amount of time 
that Student X was unlawfully deprived of the services from 
March 1, 2007 to March 31, 2008.”271 While this hour-for-hour 
approach might work well enough in some cases, often a 
student will require more educational hours than he was 
originally denied to compensate him for the denial of a FAPE, 
especially if the student has regressed due to the school’s 
failure.272 Courts could avoid some of these calculation 
ambiguities by adopting the IEP-centered FAPE standard for 
“additional services” cases273 and the grade-level standard for 
“compensatory education” cases.274 
  
 267 See supra notes 125-126. 
 268 See supra note 98 (providing the text of the 2004 amendment to the IDEA 
that addresses procedural violations). 
 269 Student X, 2008 WL 4890440, at *26; see also supra notes 203-211 and 
accompanying text (discussing the calculation of compensatory awards). 
 270 Student X, 2008 WL 4890440, at *26. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Furthermore, the hour-for-hour calculation will not be very helpful to 
courts when the denial of a FAPE is not due to a school’s failure to provide the student 
a particular service, but rather due to an inappropriate placement. 
 273 See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text. 
 274 See supra notes 207-211 and accompanying text. 
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B. Summary of Proposals 
As the cases applying the Second Circuit’s “gross 
violation” standard show, the confusion in the types of relief 
under the IDEA and the standards applied to analyze claims 
under the IDEA leaves this area of law in disarray. The 
consequences of this confusion ultimately falls upon students 
with disabilities and their families, who are faced with 
uncertain standards and even less certainty in what type of 
relief they may be able to obtain. 
To address this confusion, courts should begin to 
distinguish between these two different forms of relief: (1) 
“compensatory education” awards for students over twenty-one, 
and (2) “additional services” awards for students still protected 
by the IDEA. As long as courts refuse to make this simple 
distinction, parents and school districts will continue to take 
these cases to the courts, seeking clarification. This distinction 
would resolve a lot of uncertainty as to when compensatory 
remedies are available to remedy a denial of a FAPE, and 
would help move the circuit courts towards consistent 
application of appropriate standards. 
Most importantly, by distinguishing at the outset of a 
case between the two types of compensatory remedies—and 
which type was being sought in that particular case—courts 
could apply standards that would be more appropriate for 
ultimately crafting a remedy. In “additional services” cases 
courts should apply the IEP-centered approach for making both 
the FAPE determination and for crafting narrower, goal-
focused remedies.275 This individually-centered approach would 
likely result in more appropriately tailored additional services 
awards to students at younger ages when the services will be 
more effective. The IEP approach would also encourage schools 
to focus more seriously on the measurable goal-setting 
requirements of the IDEA.276 
In “compensatory education” cases, however, courts 
should apply the heightened “meaningful benefit” standard 
that evolved from Rowley to determine whether a student was 
provided with a FAPE.277 If the court finds that the student was 
denied a FAPE, it should then use the grade-level approach to 
calculate a more holistic remedy that allows the student to 
  
 275 See supra notes 125-130 and accompanying text. 
 276 See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text. 
 277 See supra notes 107-118 and accompanying text. 
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make up the grade-level benefits she lost due to the denial of a 
FAPE.278 This broader approach is necessary for students who 
are aging out of the IDEA’s coverage because a compensatory 
education award will likely be the student’s last chance to 
receive a publicly funded FAPE. 
Finally, courts should not adopt the Second Circuit’s 
“gross violation” standard for either compensatory education or 
additional service determinations.279 Although it originated in 
the context of purely procedural violations, there is the risk 
that courts will mistakenly apply the overly restrictive 
standard to all compensatory education cases, even those 
turning on substantive denials of a FAPE.280 Even in the case of 
purely procedural violations, however, the standard arguably 
conflicts with Congress’s increased emphasis on the IDEA’s 
procedural mandates.281 Instead of the “gross violation” 
standard, courts should apply the standard Congress adopted 
in the 2004 amendments to the IDEA to determine when 
procedural violations amount to a denial of a FAPE.282 
CONCLUSION 
Without clarification from the courts or from Congress, 
school districts and parents will continue to litigate compensatory 
educational services cases. By treating “compensatory education” 
and “additional services” as distinct remedies, administrative 
hearing officers and courts can make better FAPE determinations 
and also calculate more meaningful awards. Just as the 
standards for tuition reimbursement have evolved over time, it is 
time for the courts to advance clearer standards in compensatory 
education and additional services cases. 
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